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1 Introduction
Since the development of public key cryptography in the late 1970’s it has been an open challenge to
diversify the set of problems on which such primitives were built as well as to find faster alternatives,
since most public key schemes were several orders of magnitude slower than symmetric ones. One of
the directions was to design public key schemes from symmetric components. As public key encryption
requires trapdoors, they have been hidden in secret affine layers [59], field representations [67], biased
S-boxes and round functions [71, 74, 83], structure of connection polynomials in stream ciphers [2];
however most of these schemes were broken [45,52,66,80]. We recall that a typical symmetric cipher
is built from layers of affine transformations (A) and S-boxes (S), a design principle dating back to
Shannon [77]. It is thus natural to see what designs can be made from such components. Whereas
the classical cipher AES-128 consists of 10 rounds with 19 layers in total [65], it is striking that a lot
of effort has been put into designing public-key schemes with only 3 layers, using the ASA (affine-
substitution-affine) structure. This has indeed been the mainstream of what is known as multivariate
cryptography. However, in this case, the non-linear layer is usually an ad-hoc monolithic function over
the full state, as opposed to an array of independent S-boxes.
It has been known that the scheme SASAS with two affine and three nonlinear layers is vulnerable
to a structural attack if the nonlinear layer consists of several independent S-boxes [13]. The scheme
ASA, though secure for a random monolithic S-box, has been shown weak in concrete multivariate
proposals. In the seemingly unrelated area of white-box cryptography the ASA approach to build
obfuscated lookup tables failed multiple times. This suggests exploring the shortest scheme unbroken
so far — the ASASA construction with injective S-boxes — in the application to symmetric (black-
box), public-key, and white-box cryptography. Let us overview the related areas.
Retrospective of multivariate cryptography
The idea of multivariate cryptography dates back to the Shannon’s idea [77] that recovering the secrets
in any cryptographic scheme could be reduced to solving particular systems of (boolean) equations.
Since nearly all forms of cryptology implicitly rely on the hardness of solving some kind of equation
systems, then it must be possible to design cryptographic schemes that explicitly rely on the hardness
of this problem. In multivariate public-key schemes, the public-key itself is a system of polynomial
equations in several variables. It is well-known that solving such systems is NP-hard, even when
the polynomials are quadratic (hence the name of the MQ problem, which stands for Multivariate
Quadratic polynomial systems). An additional advantage of the MQ cryptosystems is that they seem
invulnerable to quantum algorithms and hence are candidates for Post-Quantum cryptography.
Multivariate polynomials have been used in cryptography in the early 1980’s with the purpose of
designing RSA variants with faster decryption. At this time, Imai and Matsumoto designed the first
public-key scheme explicitly based on the hardness of MQ. It made it to the general crypto community
a few years later under the name C∗ [59].
Several years later, in 1995, Patarin [66] found a devastating attack against C∗, allowing to decrypt
and to forge signatures very efficiently. Thereafter many multivariate scheme have been proposed (we
counted at least 20 of them), including a plethora of bogus and vainly complicated proposal with a
short lifespan. A few constructions stood out and received more attention than the others because of
their simplicity and their elegance, such as HFE [67], SFLASH [68] and UOV [51].
However, the practical break of the first HFE challenge, supposed to offer 80 bits of security in
2003 [38], and the demise of SFLASH in 2007 [33], just after the NESSIE consortium proposed it to be
standardized, shattered the hopes and trust of the cryptographic community at large in multivariate
cryptography. This brought the multivariate fashion to a stop.
The main problem in multivariate crypto is that the selection of candidates for the nonlinear layer
S is scarce (we will discuss this in Section 4). What remains usually has so strong a structure within,
that it can be detected and exploited even in the presence of unknown A layers. A very recent example
is the promising matrix-based scheme ABC [78] and its subsequent analysis in [63]. In the last years, a
few researchers started designing public-key schemes based on the hardness of random instances of the
MQ problem [47, 75], though no drop-in replacement for conventional public-key encryption schemes
has been proposed. Still, they are promising because there is a concensus that random instances are
hard, and all known algorithms are exponential and impractical on random systems.
This overview clearly indicates the need of a larger structure for multivariate cryptosystems, and
suggests truly random polynomials in this context, which we use in our schemes.
Retrospective of white-box cryptography
In a parallel development a notion of white-box cryptography (WBC) has been introduced in [24]. The
initial motivation was to embed symmetric secret keys into the implementation of popular standards
like AES or DES in a way that binds the attacker to the specific implementation for DRM purposes.
Several proposals have been made [22, 23] with the main idea to obfuscate key-dependent parts of
the cipher and publish them as lookup tables, so that the entire encryption routine becomes just
a sequence of table lookups. The obfuscation constitutes of wrapping the nonlinear transformation
(S) with random affine transformations (A) so that the affine layers would cancel each other after
composition.
As a result, the lookup tables are just instantiations of the ASA structure. Moreover, since the
nonlinear layers of AES and DES consist of independent S-boxes, the resulting ASA structure is very
weak and can be attacked by a number of methods [11, 43, 62, 64]. As demonstrated by Biryukov
and Shamir [13], even as large structure as SASAS is weak if the S-layers consist of smaller S-boxes.
Surprisingly overlooked by the designers of white-box schemes, the generic attack [13] exploits multiset
and differential properties of SASAS and applies to all the published white-box proposals so far. It
appears that the mainstream ciphers are just poor choice for white-box implementations due to high
diffusion properties and the way how the key is injected.
To formalize the problem, two notions have been suggested [76,81]. The weak white-box imple-
mentation of a cryptographic primitive protects the key and its derivatives i.e. aims to prevent the
key-recovery attack. This ensures that unauthorized users can not obtain any compact information
(e.g. the key or the set of subkeys) to decrypt the protected content.
The strong white-box implementation of a primitive protects from the plaintext-recovery
attack, i.e. does not allow to decrypt given the encryption routine with the embedded key. Such an
implementation may replace the public-key cryptosystems in many applications, in particular if it
is based on an existing symmetric cipher and is reasonably fast for a legitimate user. The existing
white-box implementations of AES and DES [23,24] do not comply with in this notion, since they are
easily invertible, which is strikingly different from the black-box implementations of these ciphers. So
far the only proposed candidate is the pairing-based obfuscator scheme with poor performance [76].
The ASASA-based designs may not only hide the key for the weak white-box implementation, but
also provide non-invertibility aiming for the strong white-box construction.
Our contributions
We continue to explore the design space of compact schemes built from layers of affine mappings and
S-boxes. We first note that there is no known generic attack on the 5-layered ASASA scheme with
injective S-boxes in the flavour of [13], which makes the ASASA structure a promising framework for
future white-box, black-box, and public-key schemes. Based on this principle, we propose and analyze
the following constructions in this paper:
• Two public-key / strong white-box variants of the ASASA symmetric scheme: one is based on
Daemen’s quadratic S-boxes [26] (previously used in various hash functions) and another based
on random expanding S-boxes. (Section 2). We explore standard cryptanalytic attacks such as
differential, linear and others, the recent decomposition attacks [40, 41], and a new interpolation
attack on weakened variants of our schemes (Section 3). We demonstrate that our set of parameters
offers a comfortable security margin with respect to the existing attacks.
• A concrete instantiation for a fast symmetric ASASA-based blockcipher with secret S-boxes and
affine layers and comparable with AES in it’s encryption/decryption speed (Section 4).
• A concept of memory-hard white-box implementation for a symmetric blockcipher and a concrete
family of ciphers with tunable memory requirements (Section 5). It prevents key recovery and
requires the adversary to share the entire set of lookup tables to allow an unauthorized user to
decrypt. Therefore, the cipher solves the problem of weak white-box implementation.
Related work. The idea of the ASASA structure dates back to [69]. The scheme named “2R” (which
stands for “2 Rounds”) had non-injective S-boxes and was subsequently broken in [9,39,82]. Modified
versions of 2R have been later attacked by decomposition algorithms [40,41], and no countermeasure
has been suggested. The idea of adding perturbation, or noise, to the output of ASA-type MQ-scheme
has been proposed by Patarin et al. in the design of C∗+ [70], and later by Ding [30]. It is also related
to the LWE (Learning with Error) problem, extensively discussed in [73] and used in an MQ-based
hybrid encryption scheme [47].
In Section 5 we design a weak white-box-ready blockcipher out of small components, i.e. block
ciphers with small block size. Ciphers with small blocks were also explored within shuﬄing-based
schemes by Granboulan and Pornin [44], and later by Hoang et al. [46]. Ciphers working on arbitrary
(possibly small) domains are often offered for format-preserving encryption [5].
2 Asymmetric ASASA schemes: strong white-box and public-key
The first ASASA cryptosystem, designed by Patarin and Goubin, was a public-key scheme with non-
bijective S-boxes and was easily broken by Biham, exploiting this property in [9]. Shortly afterwards,
Biryukov and Shamir explored multi-layer schemes with bijective S-boxes and demonstrated a generic
attack on the structure SASAS with two affine layers [13]. The outer S-boxes are recovered with a
variant of the Square attack, whereas the inner affine layers are peeled off with linear algebra methods.
It was clearly demonstrated that these properties disappear in larger schemes, and no attack on ASASA
or other larger structures has been proposed since.
2.1 Strong white-box security
We start with the notion of the strong white-box security that summarizes the discussion in [81].
Definition 1. Let the pair of algorithms (E,D) be a private-key encryption scheme, which takes key
K as parameter. Let OEK be a function that computes EK . We say that OEK is a secure strong
white-box implementation for EK if it is computationally hard to obtain D′ equivalent to DK given
full access to OEK .
In other words, an adversary should be unable to decrypt given the white-box implementation OEK
of EK . This notion closely resembles the definition of a trapdoor permutation [50] used to construct
a public-key encryption scheme. As we see, our asymmetric proposals are suitable for both notions.
2.2 Outline
We propose several asymmetric instantiations of the ASASA structure, which may serve both in the
white-box and public-key setting. We have not found any reasonable use for lookup tables in this
framework1 and hence look for polynomial-based S-boxes. In order to keep the reasonable size of
the description, we restrict to polynomials of degree two over some finite field, so that the resulting
scheme has degree four. This approach brings us to the area of multivariate cryptography, which aims
to design cryptographic primitives based on multivariate polynomials over finite field.
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Fig. 1. The ASASA structure: two nonlinear layers surrounded by affine layers
Let us introduce the following notations. The public key/white-box implementation is exposed as
a set of polynomials b, which is constructed out of the following composition:
b = U ◦ a2 ◦ T ◦ a1 ◦ S, (1)
where a1,a2 are nonlinear transformations, and U , T ,S are affine transformations.
There have been many proposals for nonlinear layers in the ASA structure, and various attacks
exploited these choices. Most attacks are not evidently translated into degree 4, as they compute, e.g.,
differentials of the public key, which are linear functions the ASA case. The notable exception is the
decomposition attack [40,41], that will be discussed in Section 2.3.
We offer two fresh ideas for the nonlinear layers in ASASA. The first candidate is the so called
χ-function. It derives from invertible cellular automata and was brought into symmetric cryptography
by Daemen. To the best of our knowledge, it has never been used in multivariate cryptography.
The second candidate is a set of random injective S-boxes of degree 2. Since the families of low
degree permutations are small and do not absorb much randomness, we propose to use expanding
S-boxes, which can be key-dependent. Having the expansion rate of 2, it is rather easy to obtain
injective transformations and still keep them quadratic2.
Limitations for expanding schemes. Whatever construction is used, an expanding scheme has a clear
limitation in the public-key and white-box setting. It implies that only a tiny subset of potential
ciphertexts is decryptable, which makes the encryption and decryption process non-interchangeable.
As a result, the expanding scheme can be used for encryption only and can not produce signatures.
Also in the white-box context, it can not be used for decrypting the content. On the other hand, it
can still be used to ensure tamper-resistance of software [61].
2.3 Defeating decomposition algorithm with perturbations
The authors of recently published decomposition algorithms [40, 41] claim to break ASASA schemes
with quadratic nonlinear layers with complexity O(n9), where n is the number of variables. The
1 So far all attempts to hide a trapdoor in lookup table-based designs failed. We investigated this problem and conjecture
that such scheme just does not exist, at least given the state-of-the-art in the design of preimage-resistant functions.
2 Our experiments show that S-boxes with an even smaller rate of 1.75 can be found.
decomposition problem is formulated as follows: given a set of polynomials h = (h1, . . . , hu) over
polynomial ring K[x1, . . . , xn] (K denoting an arbitrary field) find any f = (f1, . . . , fu) and g =
(g1, . . . , gn) over K[x1, . . . , xn] whose composition is equal to h:
h = (h1, . . . , hu) = (f1(g1, . . . , gn), . . . , fu(g1, . . . , gn)).
and their degree being smaller than h.
In the context of the ASASA structure with quadratic S-boxes, the sets f and g, that are produced
by a decomposition algorithm, are linearly equivalent to the internal ASA structures. This does not
fully constitute a break, since the adversary still needs to invert both ASA constructions. The proposed
algorithms also have not been applied to the parameters and fields that we choose. Nevertheless, it is
desirable to find some countermeasure.
Our idea is to introduce some perturbation just after the second S layer in the form of several key-
dependent secret polynomials of degree 4 (Figure 2). A similar approach has been used by Ding in his
modification of C∗ [30] and HFE [31], and by Bringer et al. [19] in their modification of the traceable
block cipher. In some cases (notably HFE), the “perturbation” would be identified and removed [34],
thanks to a differential attack exploiting properties of the non-linear transformations. The use of
perturbation polynomials has been also linked to the LWE (Learning with Error) framework in [47],
but the full application of LWE to multivariate cryptography is still to be explored in the future.
Denoting the perturbation polynomials as another nonlinear transformation ap we obtain the
modified public key bp:
bp = U ◦ [ap + (a2 ◦ T ◦ a1 ◦ S)], (2)
so
bp(x) = b(x) + Uap(x).
Hence the perturbation polynomials are mixed by the last affine transformation and spread over
the public key. The encryption process remains exactly the same, while for decryption we have to
guess the values of these polynomials. Suppose that we work over F2 so that ap is sparse and contains
only w polynomials. Let each polynomial be non-zero in q · 2n points. Then the noise on average
consists of qw bit flips, and we guess their positions after about
(
w
qw
)
attempts. For instance, ap with
8 non-zero polynomials of weight ≈ 2n−1 requires 26 trial decryptions on average.
We distinguish true plaintexts from false ones either by recomputing the perturbation polynomials
or by using expanding S-boxes so that noisy bits prohibit inversion. Padding the plaintexts with zero
bits also helps but disallows turning encryption to decryption. The position of noisy bits does not
matter much, since it would be concealed by the affine transformation. However, if we filter out noise
with expanding S-boxes, it makes sense to spread the noisy bits so that an S-box can still be inverted
in the presence of noise.
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Fig. 2. Small perturbations to defeat decomposition attacks as injection of sparse high-degree poly-
nomials
2.4 χ-scheme
Our first idea was to build the nonlinear transformation out of a popular quadratic S-box χ [26, Section
6.6.2], which has been used in hash the functions Panama [27], RadioGatun [7], Keccak [8]. The
transformation χ can be defined for every odd length k = 2t+ 1 and has the following features:
– It has degree 2 in the forward direction, but degree (t+ 1) in the backward direction.
– It can be efficiently inverted for every size (Appendix D).
– Its differential and linear properties have been widely studied [26].
The S-box χ of length k is defined as follows:
χ(x0, x1, x2, . . . , xk−1) = (y0, y1, y2, . . . , yk−1),
where
yi = xi ⊕ xi+1xi+2 ⊕ xi+2,
and indices are computed modulo k.
Regardless of the χ length (and hence the size of the S-box), we can formulate properties of the
whole scheme and its features:
1. For the standard block size of 128 bits, we get approximately (since the S-box size might not
divide 128) 27 input variables. Thus each output coordinate of b is a polynomial of degree 4 of 27
variables, has about
(
27
4
) ≈ 224.5 terms, so the full scheme description is about 224.5+7−3 = 228.5
bytes, or 300 MBytes.
2. The private key size is much more compact, and is dominated by three matrices with 214 bits each
(hence 213 bytes in total). If the matrices are deterministically produced out of some secret key
(e.g., 128-bit), the description is even smaller.
3. The inverse polynomial of our schemes has degree (t+ 1)2 for S-boxes of size 2t+ 1.
The S-box size (length of χ) has negligible effect on the performance because of the internal
structure of χ and its inverse (see Appendix). Hence it only affects the security of the scheme. We
choose a single S-box a of length 127, so that its inverse has degree 64, and will show later that a
system with small S-boxes is insecure.
In order to defeat decomposition algorithms and hide the ASASA structure we suggest using
perturbation polynomials. More precisely, we propose 24 random polynomials of degree 4 for the
perturbation layer ap. We pad each plaintext with 8 zero bits, so that for each guess the probability
to fit the padding is 2−8. As a result, we get 216 candidate plaintexts, and then check if we correctly
computed the noise. This filters out all wrong plaintexts with probability 1− 2−8.
Overall security. We have found a number of attacks on the χ-scheme in different variants (Section 3),
so it appears that its algebraic structure yields it vulnerable. Nevertheless, the variant with added
perturbation remains unbroken, and we offer it as cryptanalytic challenge, but not for the practical
use. We expect the perturbation theory to develop in the near future, which would suggest a more
secure set of parameters.
2.5 Scheme with expanding S-boxes
This variant provides a more compact description of the scheme since we may switch to a larger field.
First, we want the nonlinear layer be a degree-2 polynomial over Fq, q > 2, and define the linear
(affine) transformations over the same field. Though a few examples of bijective transformations of
degree 2 over a field not equal to F2 exist [55], they appear to be vulnerable to Groebner basis attacks
in our own experiments. As a solution, we suggest expanding S-boxes, whose output is twice as big
as the input. It is rather easy to design injective S-boxes of degree 2 with this property. Indeed, a
random function with expansion rate 2 has no collisions with probability around 1/2, and hence there
are enough injective transformations of the desired form.
Here is the summary of the scheme:
– Input length 128 bits (32 variables), output length 512 bits (128 variables);
– All polynomials and affine transformations are defined over F16;
– S-boxes map 16 bits to 32 bits and hence are described by 8 degree-2 polynomials over F16 of four
variables. The inverse is computed with lookup tables of size 216.
– The first nonlinear layer has 8 S-boxes and doubles the state size to 256 bits. The second layer has
16 S-boxes and further doubles to 512 bits. Accordingly, the affine transformations S, T, U operate
on 128-, 256-, and 512-bit states, respectively.
The output of the scheme is a set of 27 degree-4 polynomials over F16 over 32 input variables (each
variable is encoded with 4 bits). There are
(
25
4
) ≈ 216.5 possible terms, hence, taking 4-bit constants
into account, each polynomial is described by 220.5 bits, or 220.5+7−3 = 224.5 bytes, which is about 24
MBytes.
The private key is smaller: affine layers contain 27+7+1 + 26+6+1 + 25+5+1 ≈ 214.2 elements of F16.
The 48 S-boxes are described as 25.5+3 polynomials of 21 ≈ 24.5 terms each, hence 213 elements, plus
a few noise polynomials. In total, the private key fits into 214 bytes.
We also suggest using perturbation polynomials here. Due to the large expansion rate, we can
use rather dense perturbation layer ap and still ensure a unique decryption. We use two random
polynomials over F16 of degree four at each S-box, hence 32 polynomials in total. While decrypting
we face 162 = 28 options for each S-box output. As a result, the probability of having non-unique
decryption of the last S layer is 24 ·216+8−32 = 2−4, and if this happens the next layer filters out wrong
candidates.
As we already mentioned, the expanding character of the scheme allows only public-key and white-
box encryption, but not signature generation.
3 Security analysis of our white-box/public-key schemes
In this section we apply various attacks to weakened versions of our schemes, thus demonstrating
the design rationale behind them. We demonstrate that the added perturbations are crucial in both
schemes, and that they must be secret. We also show that S-boxes in the χ-scheme must be large,
that linearity (in contrast to affinity) of A may weaken the scheme, and that the expanding S-boxes
should not be biased (these results are presented mainly in Appendix). Our attacks are summarized
in Table 1.
These attacks allow us to evaluate the security margin of the unbroken variants of our schemes.
Since only the perturbation protects the χ-scheme from a number of practical attacks, we conclude
that it is rather fragile, but might become a good candidate for a strong white-box implementation
when the complexity of generic algorithms applied to the perturbed version is better understood. In
contrast, the expanding scheme appears to be more resistant to generic attacks, and we propose it as
a ready-to-use public-key encryption scheme and a strong white-box implementation.
Weakening Attack complexity Attack type Reference
Expanding scheme
Public perturbation 245 +D Interpolation Section 3.2
Biased S-boxes (bias= 1/8) 288 LPN Section 3.4
χ-scheme
Public perturbation 257 +D Interpolation Section 3.2
No perturbation ≈ 240 Groebner-basis Section 3.3
Small S-boxes 245 Algebraic Appendix A
Table 1. Summary of our attacks on the weakened versions of our schemes. D stands for the com-
plexity of decomposition attacks.
3.1 Generic attacks
Given the public-key of a multivariate scheme, an attacker may directly try to solve the multivariate
polynomial equations using a generic algorithm. If the public-key is a vector of m polynomials in n
over Fq, then a plaintext can always be found by exhaustive search in time O (qn). The other main
family of algorithms to solve systems of polynomial equations are Groebner-basis algorithms, such as
Buchberger’s algorithm [20] and all its derivatives [36,37].
Without going into details (the interested reader is referred to a standard textbook such as [25]),
given a system of polynomial equations f1 = · · · = fm = 0 in x1, . . . , xn, a Groebner basis of the
ideal spanned by the fi’s is an equivalent system of equations with nice properties. If the system
admits a single solution (a1, . . . , an), then a Groebner basis is precisely the vector of polynomials:
x1−a1, . . . , xn−an. It follows that if a Groebner basis can be computed, then the system of equations
can be solved.
Groebner basis algorithms work by performing polynomial elimination, i.e., by trying to eliminate
some terms by summing suitable multiples of other polynomials. The complexities of these algorithms
are difficult to analyze [3, 4]. They are essentially exponential in the highest degree reached by the
polynomials created and manipulated by the algorithms during their execution. On “generic” systems
of n equations in n variables, this degree is typically n. However, in some special cases it can be lower.
For instance, the first HFE Challenge could be broken because in HFE, for some ranges of parameters,
this degree was roughly O(log n).
3.2 Interpolation attack on the ASASA scheme with public perturbation polynomials
We stressed that the perturbation polynomials must be secret. A reader may wonder why this is
required, since these polynomials are seemingly mixed by the last affine transformation U .
In this subsection we outline an attack that peels off the perturbation polynomials and recovers
the core ASASA scheme in almost practical time. Suppose we work over a field F2 and the scheme
adds perturbation polynomials at r bit positions after the nonlinear transformation a2 (cf. Eq. (2)
and Figure 2), and the total number of variables in the scheme is n. Then we collect N plaintexts xi
such that
ap(xi) = 0.
Since polynomials of ap do not have any structure, finding a common zero is an NP-hard problem,
and we expect that 2r plaintexts must be tried to find a right one. Hence the naive complexity of this
step is N2r evaluations3 of ap.
Then we evaluate the right plaintexts on the perturbed scheme bp. Since ap is zero, we have
bp(xi) = U ◦ a2 ◦ T ◦ a1 ◦ S(xi).
Therefore, we know the evaluation of the ASASA scheme without perturbations on N plaintexts. Since
the scheme has degree 4, the polynomial coefficients can be recovered by the Lagrange interpolation.
There are
∑4
i=0
(
n
i
)
monomials of degree 4 or smaller, hence N must slightly exceed
∑4
i=0
(
n
i
)
to
allow for linear dependencies among plaintexts. For the typical value n = 27 we need about 225
right plaintexts to fully recover the core ASASA polynomials and then launch the decomposition
attack. However, the interpolation itself is not a trivial procedure, since we deal with a multivariate
function. Only recently an algorithm with complexity quadratic in the number of monomials has been
proposed [1]. Equipped with it, we recover a single polynomial in 250 bit operations, and the entire
bp in 2
57 operations. In turn, 225 right plaintexts can be obtained for 16 noisy bits in 241 evaluations
of ap, and for 24 noisy bits – in 2
49 evaluations, which is close to 255 bit operations. Therefore, the
total complexity of recovering (x) is about 257 bit operations.
This attack clearly shows that the perturbation polynomials must not be public and should not
have any structure that would allow the adversary to find their common zeros. We do not see how
the attack can be applied to secret polynomials.
3 Finding subsequent solutions might be easier, but this step is not a dominant in our attack complexity.
3.3 Algebraic attack on the plain χ-scheme
Although χ has been used successfully in the symmetric world, it turns out to be a complete disaster
in a multivariate context. An ASA construction where S = χ, with n = 127 variables over F2 is broken
in a few seconds by a direct Groebner basis computation. A two-layer ASASA construction is not more
secure, and can be broken in less than two hours using the implementation of the F4 algorithm of the
MAGMA computer algebra system [18] (and 100Gbytes of RAM). This happens because a Groebner
basis can be computed by manipulating polynomials of small, constant degree (typically 3 or 6).
Let us give some detailed explanation for the insecurity of the ASA construction. We work within
the polynomial ring R = F2 [x0, . . . , xn−1], and we consider the ideal of R:
I = 〈f0, . . . , fn−1, x02 − x0, . . . , xn−12 − xn−1〉
where fi = xi +xi+2 +xi+1xi+2 + ai (all indices are taken modulo n), and where the ai are constants.
Any solution (in the xi’s) making all the polynomials in I vanish simultaneously, is a solution of
χ(x1, . . . , xn) = (a0, . . . , an−1). Such a solution always exists, and is unique.
We will show that there are many linear polynomials in this ideal, and that they can be “easily”
discovered (by manipulating small-degree polynomials). Indeed:
xi+1 · fi − xi+2 ·
(
xi+1
2 − xi+1
)
+ fi−1 = (xi−1 + xi+1)− (ai−1 + ai+1)
The expression on the left-hand side is a polynomial combination of elements of I, therefore it belongs
to I. As a consequence, the linear polynomial on the right-hand side can be found inside I after
performing a few steps of polynomial elimination on polynomials of degree less than 3.
After these n linear relations have been found, another few steps of polynomial elimination allows
all the variables but one to disappear. This shows that a Groebner basis of the ideal I can be computed
in polynomial time. Now, performing a (random) linear change of coordinate in I, or replacing the
generators of I by (random) linear combinations thereof does not change this fact. As a conclusion,
the ASA construction, where S is the χ-function, falls victim to a direct algebraic attack, by running
any Groebner basis algorithm on the equations defining the “white-box”.
This reasoning extends to the ASASA construction where both non-linear layers are χ (however,
this time the degree is 6). It is an open question of how much the added perturbation slows the
Groebner-basis attacks (our implementation does not break the selected noise parameters in reasonable
time).
3.4 Attack on the expanding scheme with biased S-boxes
If S-box output bits are biased, an attack exploiting this bias can be applied. The last affine trans-
formation can be viewed as affine over F2, so the further analysis without loss of generality applies to
any field of characteristic two.
We target a single biased bit b after the second layer of expanding S-boxes: the probability P[b = 1]
of its equality to 1 is equal to p 6= 12 . If y is a ciphertext, then following previous notations, the biased
bit is the b-th component of U−1 · y. In other terms, if u denotes the b-th line of U−1, then 〈u, y〉 = b.
Now, assume we collect a large number (say N) of ciphertexts. We stack them vertically into a
matrix C, which thus has N rows. Let us also assume that b is biased towards zero. Then we have
the “noisy linear system”:
u · C = e,
where e is a vector of i.i.d. random variables following the Bernoulli distribution with mean p. Recov-
ering u is exactly an instance of the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem.
The best known algorithms to solve LPN are variants of the BKW algorithm [15], whose complexity
is of order O (2n/ logn). The only actual implementation (along with algorithmic improvements) is
described in [56], and some more tweaks are given in [6]. The actual complexities of these algorithms
depend on the bias (their efficiency decreases when the bias gets closer to zero).
With n = 512 variables, and if P[b = 1] = 1/8, then the implementation of [56] is said to require
280 bits of memory (plus the time needed to sort this much memory 80 times). However, time-memory
tradeoffs, plus algorithmic improvements, allow [6] to conclude that the same problem can be solved
in 259 bits memory and less than 2100 bits operations. If 280 bits of memory are available, then the
running-time could be decreased to 288 bit operations.
This beats more naive approaches, such as, for instance, enumerating all the possible sparse pos-
sibilities for the first n components of e, and solving the corresponding linear system for each trial.
The above instance would require more than 2120 operations to be solved using the naive approach.
Of course, the attack has to be repeated for each row of U−1, and possibly twice for each row
(assuming that the targeted bit is biased towards zero, or towards one). Note that the above esti-
mates are extremely pessimistic; in random expanding S-boxes of degree 2, the biases we observed
experimentally are much lower than what was used above (we observed P[b = 1] ≈ 0.49).
After U is recovered, we can view the output of expanding S-boxes, and are likely to recover them
by interpolation due to low degree.
4 Black-box ASASA schemes
Given rather low performance and large key size of the public-key ASASA schemes, a reader may
wonder if significant performance increase can be achieved with lower security goals. We answer this
question twofold. First, we propose a generic black-box symmetric cipher based on the five layerASASA.
The cipher is expected to have a very fast software implementation thanks to vector instructions in
modern processors. Secondly, we use a small version of this cipher as a building block in achieving
weak white-box security (Section 5).
4.1 Design
We propose a symmetric cipher with a classical set of parameters, widely used in AES and other
designs. It has a block of n = 128 bits with m = 8 bit S-boxes and a choice of key-sizes 128 – 256
bits. Let us outline specific parameters for linear and nonlinear layers.
Affine layers. A key-dependent n × n affine transformation can be produced out of the master key
K by any secure key derivation function HK (for example a fast stream cipher, or a block cipher in
the counter mode (Appendix B)), and checking that the resultant matrix is invertible, this can be
done in O(n3) steps, and we also generate an n-bit constant 4. The branch number of the matrix [28]
determines the minimum number of active S-boxes in a differential trail, and thus the upper bound
on the trail probability. Since the matrix is random, we expect the branch number to be close to the
maximum possible (the number of S-boxes n/m plus one). Note that for each affine layer a new matrix
is generated.
Nonlinear layers. Typically, nonlinear layers of symmetric ciphers consist of several small S-boxes,
which have a compact description [16, 28]. For the ASASA scheme we propose to use 32 randomly
generated 8-bit invertible S-boxes, which are all different and key-dependent. We note that efficiency
of generic attacks on the SASAS structure [13] increases if smaller S-boxes are used, and thus it may
be interesting in the future to explore full block size non-linear layers, for which such attack would
not work.
Large S-box alternatives. The choice for large block algorithmic S-boxes is surprisingly limited. Un-
less the S-boxes are themselves multi-layer permutations (e.g., fixed-key ciphers), a compact descrip-
tion is typically delivered in the algebraic form as a function over an appropriate finite field. The
resulting permutation polynomials have become an active research topic in the recent years. The
well known example is X2
k+1 over F2n (scheme C* [59]); the more recent and interesting include(
X2
k
+X + a
)−l
+ X over F2n by Zeng et al. [84] (derived from Helleseth-Zinoviev polynomials)
4 Non-anonymous final version of this paper will link to implementations of our schemes and challenges gradually
increasing complexity for the interested cryptanalysts.
and
(
Xp
k −X + a
) pn+1
2
+ Xp
k
+ X over Fpn where p is odd [85]. Further nontrivial examples can
be found in [14, 21, 54, 55, 57]. It thus can be an interesting second challenge to break the symmetric
ASASA scheme with known block-wide non-linear layers. Note however that fixed S-boxes do not offer
implementation advantage and thus we would keep S-boxes secret and randomly generated in the
main variant of our scheme.
Implementation. The combined SA transformations can be implemented quite cheaply. It is well
known from, e.g., fast AES implementations, that a multiplication of n-bit vector by n×n-bit matrix
over F2 can be expressed as n XORs of n-bit vectors, and with table lookups — as n/16 XORs and
n/16 lookups in tables of size 216. Let’s consider the specific choice of n = 128 and m = 8 and assume
that SIMD 128-bit operations can be performed in a single clock cycle (this is a reasonable assumption
when a cipher is used, e.g., in the CTR mode). Then we need 16 table lookups and 16 XORs for the
layers: A, SA, SA, which gives us 48/16=3 lookups and 3 XORs per byte, which is probably faster
than optimized software implementations of AES [49] (without the special AES instructions). Total
memory requirement for such implementation is: 3 ·2m( nm)2 = 28 ·16 ·3 ·16 ≈ 196 Kbytes. The private
key size is even smaller: 14 KBytes (3 matrices of size 211 bytes and 32 S-boxes of 28 bytes each).
A byteslice implementation of the black-box ASASA in the CTR mode would require tables only 4
times as large as in AES, and would allow to work with a single table many times, so we do not
expect cache problems on modern CPUs. We stress that such an implementation is a black-box, not
a white-box implementation of a cipher, i.e. the lookup tables should not be available to the attacker.
4.2 Security analysis
Differential and linear attacks. We expect the secret linear layers to hide all differential [10] and
linear [58] properties of the cipher, since it becomes impossible to figure out any high-probability
differential or linear trail. It can be argued, however, that the existence of high-probability charac-
teristics may lead to efficient distinguishers. For instance, Dunkelman and Keller showed in [35] that
if for every α the differential probabilities {α → β} are much higher (or much lower) than for a
random permutation, then this can be used as a distinguisher. The authors further suggested the
parameter of effective linearity that essentially measures the average probability of the boomerang
difference quartet (α,K) over all possible α,K and is supposed to take even unknown characteristics
into account.
It is rather easy to show that only a tiny fraction of input differences may lead to high-probability
differentials. Indeed, with probability 1−2(16−1)−64 = 1−2−49 at least 8 S-boxes at the first S layer are
active. The highest differential probability is then delivered by a trail that activates all S-boxes in the
second S layer. In turn, the highest differential probability that we expect for every input difference
α can be upper bounded by 2−5. Therefore, we expect that only 2−49 of all input differences yield
characteristics with probabilities higher than 2−5·24 = 2−120.
There exist characteristics that activate 16 + 1 = 17 active S-boxes and probabilities of about
2−85 or slightly higher. They are even easy to find in the known-key setting. However, finding them
in the secret-key setting is likely to require a birthday-like approach to activate only a few S-boxes.
This implies the complexity close to 260 to find such a characteristic, which puts the complexity of
the attack close to the exhaustive search.
Finally, we have not found any use for the efficient linearity parameter, as it seems to be difficult to
estimate it for our construction. The authors of [35] did it for the 2-round Feistel scheme surrounded
by Vaudenay’s decorrelation module [79], which should be compared to the SAS structure wrapped
with A layers in our case. The latter problem is not only more difficult, but also would yield a random
variable as the answer. Distinguishing whether this variable follows the distribution expected from
the random permutation is a separate and challenging problem.
Algebraic attacks. We expect the random S-box of width m to have the algebraic degree m− 1 = 7.
As a result, the entire scheme can be represented by a polynomial of degree 49 over F2. As observed
in [60], the low degree can be detected by applying differentials of the same order to the ciphertext.
Therefore, an attacker can distinguish the ASASA construction from random given 249 data and time.
However, this does not lead to the disclose of the plaintext.
Other attacks. The boomerang and impossible differential attack can be also of concern. We have
tried basic and improved versions of these attacks, and in all cases the randomness of the affine
layers prevented us from mounting an attack. However, it is possible to build boomerang quartets in
the known-key setting by activating a single S-box at both sides of the boomerang. Whether such
properties can be carried out to the secret-key setting is the object of the future research. Impossible
differential attacks typically rely on truncated differentials with probability 1 which exist in some
ciphers due to incomplete diffusion. Since in our case the random affine layers provide complete
diffusion and since the entrance into and the exit from the scheme are both guarded by these affine
layers, chosen plaintext attacks have little chance of predicting truncated values somewhere inside the
scheme.
Our scheme should be more secure than a two-round Even-Mansour cipher [17], where the subkeys
are simply xored to the internal state (as opposed to applying a full-blown secret affine transformation
to the internal state). The recent attack on the 2-round Even-Mansour [32] explicitly requires the
access to the internal permutation and thus can not be immediately used in our setting.
The meet-in-the-middle attacks [29, 48] do not apply to our scheme, because the amount of key
material used to compute any matching variable is too large (several S-boxes and a large part of
the affine transformation). The cube attacks do not apply, since there is no compact polynomial
representation of the scheme.
Structural attack. Finally, we investigate the structural attack from [13]. We will see that even though
it does not apply to the 128-bit ASASA cipher, it allows to bound the security level of schemes with
smaller block, which are used in Section 5. First, we recall the main property preserved by the SASA
structure with m-bit S-boxes:
Theorem 1 ( [13]). Let {x1, x2, . . . , x2m} be the inputs to the SASA structure such that the input
bits to one S-box take all possible combinations whereas the other bits are constant. Then the XOR of
all outputs is the all-zero bit vector:⊕
i
SASA(xi) = (0, 0, . . . , 0).
Now consider the input y to some m-bit S-box in the first S layer of the ASASA scheme E. It is an
affine function of the scheme input y:
y = M · x⊕ c,
where M is an (m× n)-matrix and c is a constant. Let L be an (n× n)-matrix such that
M × L = (M ′ 0 0 · · · 0,) (3)
where M ′ is a (m ×m)- submatrix. If we apply E to L · x, then y depends only on the first m bits
of x. Thus we compose inputs {x1, x2, . . . , x2m} as in Theorem 1, multiply them by L and apply E.
The output bits must sum to 0 bitwise. This property allows to recover the outer affine layer and
eventually all the components of E. Equation (3) holds with probability 2−(n−m)m, which makes the
attack impractical for large n. However, for small n it might be efficient. Therefore, the maximum
security level of the ASASA scheme with n variables and m-bit S-boxes does not exceed (n −m)m
bits.
For our design, this gives the upper bound of 960 bits, which is far larger than the key length
which is used to generate the affine and nonlinear layers. As a result, we claim the 128-bit security
level for our design, even though a small factor over exhaustive key search might be saved by biclique
attacks or by exploiting the full codebook. This is still higher security than what is offered by 2048
bit RSA.
5 Proposal for weak white-box security: ASASA-based block cipher
5.1 Weak white-box security
Definition 2. Let the pair of algorithms (E,D) be a private-key encryption scheme, which takes key
K as a parameter. We call F(K) the equivalent key set for key K, if from any element from F(K) it
is easy to get an algorithm equivalent to EK , i.e. there is an (efficient) algorithm
A(K)→ E ′,
where E ′ equivalent to EK .
Definition 3. The function OEK is a T -secure weak white-box implementation for EK if it is com-
putationally hard to obtain K ∈ F(K) of length less than T given full access to OEK .
In other words, an adversary who gets a secure weak white-box implementation is unable to find
out any compact (shorter than T ) equivalent representation of it. In the practical sense, an adversary
who wants to share a protected implementation of the encryption routine, would have to share the
entire code. Such ciphers are motivated by DRM applications, which aim to prohibit the users of
protected content from sharing the information needed to decrypt it. Clearly, in this context there
is little practical difference between sharing the key and sharing, say, the set of subkeys as long as
the other cipher operations are independent of the key. Therefore, naive methods of key protection,
e.g. transforming it with a preimage-resistant hash function, would not prevent an attack. Ideally, the
adversary would have to isolate and extract the entire decryption routine, which might be hard per
se.
5.2 Weak white-box cipher proposal
In this section we propose a blockcipher family, which conforms to the weak white-box security notion,
so that it is computationally infeasible to derive a key or any other compact secret information from
the white-box implementation.
We further say that the white-box implementation is memory-hard if it requires a pre-specified
and large enough amount of memory in the spirit of memory-hard key-derivation functions [72]. This
concept is even stronger than the T -secure weak WB implementations, as an adversary is unable
to reduce the implementation size at all and thus would have to publish the entire set of lookup
tables. In contrast to earlier white-box designs, we offer a set of ciphers with a wide range of memory
requirements.
Our memory-hard cipher consists of a number of smaller components, which are exposed as
lookup tables in the white-box implementation. Each component is either a small-block ASASA cipher,
adapted from the construction in Section 4, or just a single S-box. The S-boxes are minimum 8-bit
wide to avoid equivalence problems [12], but 10-, and 12-bit ones are also used. All S-boxes and affine
layers are derived in a deterministic way from the secret key. In fact, it is enough to have linear, not
affine, layers, since the constant can be kept in the S-boxes. To estimate memory requirements, we
assume for simplicity that each table output fits an integer number of bytes (e.g., 2 bytes for 10-bit
S-boxes).
We propose the SPN structure for the cipher, i.e. we alternate layers of smaller ciphers (denote
their number by R) with a public linear transformation L. Any transformation with good diffusion
shall be fine. For the 64-bit block it could be the MixBytes transformation of Grøstl [42], and for the
128-bit block — two pairs of this transformation separated by shuﬄing the 32-bit subwords between
the outputs. Recalling that AES can be partitioned into 5 rounds with 4 32-bit Super S-boxes in each,
we propose R layers for similar security margin. The cipher’s pseudocode is as follows (Figure 3):
– Repeat R times;
• Apply R parallel ASASA-based distinct blockciphers;
• Apply the linear transformation L to the entire state.
We outline specific parameters and memory requirements for 64- and 128-bit blockciphers in
Table 2. The 16-bit S layer has two 8-bit S-boxes, the 18-bit – 8-bit and 10-bit S-boxes, the 20-
bit – two 10-bit S-boxes, and the 24-bit – three 8-bit S-boxes. We see that whereas the black-box
implementation is a few dozen KBytes, the white-box implementation can be made large enough in
the range from 2 MBytes to several GBytes.
Rows Component type Components in row
Security level
(bits)
White-box memory Black-box memory
64-bit block
4 ASASA 4×(16-bit) 64 2MB 16 KB
4 ASASA 3×(18-bit) + 10-bit 64 9 MB 32 KB
128-bit block
8 ASASA 8×(16-bit) 64 8 MB 64 KB
8 ASASASA 8×(16-bit) 128 8 MB 96 KB
8 ASASA 6×(18-bit) + 2×(10-bit) 80 36 MB 130 KB
8 ASASA 24-bit + 6×(16-bit) +8-bit 64 384 MB 64 KB
8 ASASASA 24-bit + 6×(16-bit) +8-bit 128 384 MB 96 KB
6 ASASA 5×(24-bit) + 8-bit 128 1.4 GB 75 KB
5 ASASA 4×(28-bit) + (16-bit) 64 20 GB 85 KB
5 ASASASA 4×(28-bit) + (16-bit) 128 20 GB 130 KB
Table 2. Parameters and memory requirements of white-box and black-box implementations for
the 128-bit blockcipher. We assume that n-bit component occupies dn8 e2n bytes of memory in the
white-box implementation.
E1,1
L
R subciphers
R iterations
E1,2 E
1,R
ER,1 ER,2 ER,R
L
A
S
A
S
A
Fig. 3. Blockcipher family for weak white-box security.
Security analysis. Our ASASA components have very small block and only a few S-boxes in the S
layer. Some attacks that are infeasible on the 128-bit block, may have practical complexity on the
16-bit block. The best attack we could find was presented in Section 4.2 and has complexity 2(n−m)m
for m-bit S-boxes and the n-bit block. As a result, the 16-bit ASASA components with 8-bit S-boxes
have maximum security level of 64 bits, the 20-bit components — 100 bits, and 24-bit components
with 8-bit S-boxes — 128 bits.
An easy way to increase the security level is to add two more layers, thus producing ASASASA
components. This yields a 50% increase of the private key size, but no increase in the white-box
implementation size. Since we have not found a way to expand our attack to this structure, we
conjecture its security level to 128 bits. In Table 2 we provide both variants so that a protocol
designer may choose between them according to his own requirements.
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6 Conclusion
We have explored deeply the state of the art in black-box, white-box, and multivariate public key cryp-
tography, and concluded that the ASASA structure is the minimal generic construction which is still
unbroken. We constructed cipher candidates for all these settings. We designed two ASASA schemes
for public-key cryptography based on multivariate polynomials. We showed how to avoid existing
attacks on multivariate schemes, including the recent powerful decomposition algorithms by adding
appropriate perturbation functions. In the traditional black-box setting we offered a cryptanalytic
challenge of a fast cipher with small random S-boxes and random affine layers.
We proposed several solutions for white-box cryptography, both in weak and strong security no-
tions. In the weak model, we designed a memory-hard cipher, which prohibits key extraction and
requires an adversary to spend a large, pre-defined amount of memory. It is based on small ASASA
components. We showed how our multivariate schemes can be used as strong white-box implementa-
tions, as they are not invertible without the key and allow fast encryption and decryption for legiti-
mate users. We compare the implementation size of our schemes with other unbroken MQ-systems in
Table 3.
Our findings indicate a number of future research directions. First, it would be interesting to
explore algorithmic large S-boxes in the black-box ASASA structure, e.g. instantiated with recently
found permutation polynomials. Secondly, a theory of perturbation layers as a countermeasure to
generic decomposition algorithms needs to be developed, possibly along the concept of LWE (Learning
with Error). Thirdly, we suggest investigating the actual security level of small-block (16-,20-, 24-bit)
ASASA schemes to figure out which components are suitable for weak white-box implementations.
Finally, open question is to develop constructions with smaller descriptions (e.g., within 1 MByte),
which are bijective, suitable for digital signatures, and allow strong white-box implementations.
Scheme Field # variables # polynomials Degree Private key size PK/white-box size Ref.
Black-box ASASA F2 128 - - 14 KB 196 KB Sec. 4
χ-scheme* F2 127 127 4 8 KB 300 MB Sec. 2
Expanding scheme F16 32 128 4 16 KB 24 MB Sec. 2
Memory-hard cipher F2 64 - - 16-32 KB 2-8 MB Sec. 5
Memory-hard cipher F2 128 - - 64-130 KB 8 MB – 20 GB Sec. 5
HFE F16 64 64 2 48 KB 520 KB [67]
UOV F256 78 26 2 71 KB 80 KB [51]
* — several variants broken in this paper.
Table 3. Our schemes in comparison, along with (presumably) secure parameters for UOV and HFE.
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A Attack on χ-scheme with small S-boxes and linear transformations
Let’s consider a weakened version of the χ-scheme, where we remove constants from the affine trans-
formations, and consider small S-boxes. In this section we show a very efficient attack on the modified
scheme, which works for very large block sizes. As a result, the affinity should be explicitly required
from the first two A layers, but can be changed to linearity for the last one.
The public key is then defined as follows:
b = U ◦ a ◦ T ◦ a ◦ S, (4)
where a consists of 14 9-bit S-boxes. Hence the inverse of b has degree 52 = 25.
Let us consider the degree-1 part of polynomials b and a. We have the following equation:
b(1) = U × a(1) × T × a(1) × S. (5)
Whereas S, T, U are regular matrices, the matrix a(1) is singular, and its kernel is the linear span of
the kernels of χ(1). The latter consists of two vectors: 1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
9
) and 0 = (0, 0, . . . , 0), so has
dimension 1, and
dim ker a(1) = 14.
Now we note that
ker b(1) = ker
(
a(1) × T × a(1) × S
)
so ker b(1) ≤ 2 · ker a(1) = 28. In fact, we expect that ker b(1) = 28.
The attack proceeds as follows. We select vector q ∈ ker a(1) = (1, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
63
, 0, 0, . . . , 0). Then we
randomly select vector p ∈ ker b(1). Since S−1(q) ∈ ker b(1), we get
P[S(p) = q] ≥ 2−28.
Assuming that S(p) = q, we compute bp = b(x+ p):
bp = U ◦ a ◦ T ◦ a ◦ S(x+ p) = U ◦ a ◦ T ◦ a (S(x) + q) = U ◦ a ◦ T ◦ [a + Lq] ◦ S(x),
where Lq(y) = a(y) + a(y + q) — a first-order derivative of a (hence a linear function of y). Due to
specific form of Lq (see details below), we obtain the following matrix equation(
A1 A2
A3 A4
)
= b(1)p + b
(1) = V × Lq × S =
(
V1S
′
1 V1S
′
2
V3S
′
1 V3S
′
2
)
, (6)
where V = U × a(1) × T .
Our next assumption is that both V1 and V3 are invertible, which for random V holds with the
total probability 2−4 (Appendix C). Then we get a system of four matrix equations:
A1 = V1S
′
1;
A2 = V1S
′
2;
A3 = V3S
′
1;
A4 = V3S
′
2.
(7)
where we multiply both sides by either V
(−1)
1 or V
(−1)
3 . Hence we get a quadratic system of 4 · 632
linear equations, which we solve with probability 2−2.
Therefore, we compute V1 and V3 from one guess of p with the total probability 2
−28−4−2 = 2−34.
Now we show how to exploit equivalences in linear transformations, increase the probability to 2−18,
and recover the whole V with complexity of about 245 bit operations.
Details. We note that
χ(x+ 1) = χ(x) +−→x +−→−→x ,
where −→x is the rotation of x to the right by 1. Hence the matrix Lq is quasi-diagonal, with 7 matrices
R9 along the lead diagonal in the beginning and zeros afterwards.
R9
R9
R9
0
0
0
0
126× 126
R9 =Lq =
11 0
11 00
1 0
1 10
9× 9
0
0
01 0
0
Note that the position of blocks R9 depend on the structure of q.
The linear part of bp is defined as follows:
b(1)p = U ◦ a(1) ◦ T ◦
[
a(1) + Lq
]
◦ S. (8)
Summing Equations (5) and (8), we get
b(1)p + b
(1) = U ◦ a(1) ◦ T ◦ Lq ◦ S (9)
Let us denote U ◦ a(1) ◦ T by V =
(
V1 V2
V3 V4
)
, where Vi are submatrices of size 63 × 63. Let also
S =
(
S1 S2
S3 S4
)
with quadratic submatrices of the same size. Due to the form of Lq, we have that
Lq × S =
(
S′1 S′2
0 0
)
and obtain Equation (6).
Improvement. First, we note that there are many equivalent (≡) transformation pairs (S, T ). By the
equivalence we understand that they produce the same b. Indeed, since a is composed of identical
S-boxes,
(S1, T1) ≡ (pi−1 ◦ S1, T1 ◦ pi),
where pi is an arbitrary permutation of S-boxes.
Hence if S(p) = pi(q) for one of such permutations pi, we still derive some meaningful information
about V . Let Qpi be the matrix over F126×1262 corresponding to the permutation pi of S-boxes. Then
bp = U ◦ a ◦ T ◦ a ◦ S(x+ p) = U ◦ a ◦ T ◦ a (S(x) + pi(q)) = U ◦ a ◦ T ◦ a
(
pi
(
pi(−1)(S(x)) + q
))
=
= U ◦ a ◦ T ◦ pi ◦ a
(
pi(−1)(S(x)) + q
)
= U ◦ a ◦ T ◦ pi ◦ [a + Lq] ◦ pi−1(S(x))
Then we note that
a ≡ pi ◦ a ◦ pi−1 =⇒ Qpi × a−1 ×Q−1pi = a−1
and recover the left half of V ×Qpi instead of V .
Now we note that the left multiplication by Qpi permutes rows, whereas the right multiplication
permutes columns. Hence for each guess of p we recover the left half of V × Qpi for some pi, which
yields some 7 out of 14 columns of V . Over the multiple guesses of p, the same columns get proposed
multiple times. The attack algorithm then is as follows:
1. Fix q ∈ ker a(1) = (1, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
63
, 0, 0, . . . , 0).
2. Randomly select p ∈ ker b(1).
3. Assuming that S(p) = pi(q) for some pi, try to recover the left half of V ×Qpi. If succeeded, store
the resulting 7 columns in the memory.
4. If any column is proposed more than one time, store it in another table. Until all the 14 columns
are proposed twice, go to step 1.
Let us compute the running time of the modified attack algorithm. There are
(
14
7
) ≈ 212 possible
values of pi(q), hence the assumption at Step 3 holds with probability 2−28+12 = 2−16. The resulting
system has 2−6 chance to resolve into 7 columns of the actual V . To make each column be proposed
twice, we have to succeed at Step 3 four times. Hence Steps 1-3 are executed 224 times on average.
Step 3 is the bottleneck, as it inverts four matrices of size 26 and solve a system of size 27. This yields
about 220 bit multiplications and slightly larger number of xors. In total, we expect to recover V (or
its equivalent) with complexity of around 245 binary operations.
Having computed V , we multiply it by Lq and easily recover S
−1 and then S. It remains to recover
T and U , and we expect this operation to be less costly than the recovery of S.
B Layer generation procedure
In this section we give an example of how the layers of the ASASA schemes can be generated. Assume
that we have the AES encryption procedure E and a properly generated master key K; if such routines
are unavailable, then generic methods like HKDF [53] can be used.
– To generate the t-bit S-box, we produce t2t bits of keystream by encrypting plaintexts of the form
0︸︷︷︸
56 bits
|| q︸︷︷︸
8 bits
|| i︸︷︷︸
64 bits
,
where q is the number of the S-box and i is the counter. Each t-bit string selects an entry for S(i)
out of the previously unassigned values.
– To generate an invertible n× n matrix, we produce the keystream by encrypting
0︸︷︷︸
55 bits
1|| q︸︷︷︸
8 bits
|| i︸︷︷︸
64 bits
,
where q is the number of the A layer and i is the counter. When an n-bit string is produced, we
add it to the matrix as a row and check if the matrix has the maximal rank. If not, the string is
discarded.
It is clear that the employed domain separation method ensures that the counter values used to
produce S-boxes and matrices do not overlap.
C Invertible matrices over F2
The number of invertible matrices of size n× n over F2 is computed as follows:
Gn = (2
n − 1) · (2n − 2) · (2n − 4) · · · (2n − 2n−1) = 2n2 · (1− 1
2n
) · (1− 1
2n−1
) · · · (1− 1
2
).
It is known that
Gn/2
n2 > 0.288788.
D The inverse of χ
A generic algorithm to compute the inverse of χ is as follows:
1. Given x = (x0, x1, . . . , xk−1) find χ−1(x);
2. Let y ← x;
3. For 0 ≤ i < 3bk2c
– y(k−2)i ← y(k−2)i ⊕ x(k−2)i+2 · x(k−2)i+1.
4. Return y.
The algorithm makes O(k) bit operations. In practice, it can be optimized with bitslicing technique.
For the 9-bit S-box that is based on the χ transformation, the inverse polynomials have the
following structure:
p3(x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7, x8) = x3+(x5+(x7+(x0+x2∗(x1+1))∗(x8+1))∗(x6+1))∗(x4+1) =
= x3 + (x5 + (x7 + (x0 + x2 ∗ x1) ∗ x8)x6)x4 =
= x3 + (x5 + (x7 + x0 + x2x1 + x2 + x0x8 + x2x1x8 + x2x8)x6)x4 =
= x3 + (x5 + x7 + x0 + x2x1 + x2 + x0x8 + x2x1x8 + x2x8 + x7x6+
+ x0x6 + x2x1x6 + x2x6 + x0x8x6 + x2x1x8x6 + x2x8x6)x4.
